When any man completes a feat which exceeds our common understanding, we are inspired with awe. If our hearts are not consumed by a jealous umbrage, we feel an impetus to applaud and promulgate encouragement. Though not a particularly salient concept in human discourse, the notions of what is worthy of respect, honor, and awards may not be as limpid as we expect.

Suppose hundreds of students have enrolled in a ball-throwing competition. Every student throws their ball individually. One student throws the ball with the same force as his peers, but by an auspicious gust of wind, has his ball go the farthest.

At the end of the competition, he is awarded a medal and recognition from faculty and students alike. Is he worthy of such praise?

No, it seems. The determinative factor of the student's success was exogenous and unaccounted for, an opportunity not afforded to others. How can a person be worthy of something he is not responsible for?

Let us consider a different situation.

Six people are tasked with creating a pie. The person who provides the best slice, determined by an independent set of taste-testers, will be crowned as the victor.

One person has all of the ingredients necessary for a standard pie in his house, and often makes pies for his family. The pie he creates, however, is much worse than his typical quality. He receives last place.

One person loses interest in the competition altogether. He has his daughter make the pie for him. Though a satisfactory pie, it receives fifth place.

One person has all of the ingredients necessary for a standard pie in his house and is extremely knowledgeable in baking. He creates a pie which far exceeds the expectations for its ingredients. Even so, he receives fourth place.

One person has none of the ingredients necessary. Because of his financial situation, he must be frugal. He researches for hours, strategizing how to create a pie which can win and how to eke out such a feat. After purchasing the ingredients and creating a pie, it does decently well. He receives third place.

One person has all of the ingredients necessary for a standard pie, but since she is financially privileged, purchases premium ingredients from a high-class bakery. Though she is not well-versed in baking, her pie does well at second place.

The last person did not bake a pie. She visited her local bakery and purchased their world-class pie instead. Naturally, it is remarkable. Her pie earns first place.

Though all parties agreed to the methodology of determining who obtains the gree, they may have objections upon obtaining the knowledge of the circumstances of each pie creation.

There were no rules which stipulated that the pies submitted must be created by the contestants. However, a contestant may claim that such a rule was intimated, as competitions are typically in the nature of “deciding who’s best,” therefore such a rule ought to be considered tacit unless expressly stated absent, according to history and gumption.

Another complaint which may arise is the difference in ingredient quality. Resuming with the philosophy of competitions as a function to determine the most adept of a cohort, a discrepancy in the tools which are used by contestants which engender differences not marginal severely jeopardizes such a competition’s raison d’être. This complaint, however, will likely be dismissed because the possibility of non-marginal differences in tools ought to have been expected, provided that the contestants knew each other, and because it ought to have been expected, was agreed to by participation.

Finally, it may be asked, who is most worthy of praise? This question and “whose product’s ultimate state is the most consummate” are typically treated as fungible. There are many instances, however, where this is not the case.

If two men both create empires, yet one began with very little but the other began with affluence, we will make no scruple to regard the former man as more worthy of award and recognition. If we increase the size of the latter empire’s riches such that the difference between them is no longer marginal yet still a less sizable change in fortune, however, will we still maintain this position?

It seems we are infatuated with two types of impressiveness in these considerations: absolute and relative. We recognize the superiority of he who holds the highest position, yet also laud the man below him who has increased his standing by a greater degree, or the same degree under a condition which increases difficulty, such as lessened time or resources.

Though relativity can reveal he who is most adept, it may be the case that we are simply propensed to prefer the absolute. Between a man who was born running at blazing speeds, and one who was born unable to run yet reached speeds incredible still less than, who is more worthy of recognition, award, and honor? And who will receive it?

As established, it seems impossible that a man be worthy of things for which he is not responsible; it would mean we award mankind not for actions but for circumstances created not by him. Simultaneously, regardless of whether we claim the initially disabled more worthy or not, it seems extremely likely that we will not distribute the majority of our praises unto him. We are far too affected by the absolute impressiveness of his counterpart that, inevitably, our lauding gravitates toward him, the privileged.

Returning to the issue of the pies, even if we reject the concept of absolute impressiveness in our consideration of worthiness, a contention arises between third and fourth place.

We have established that worth is determined by action, but we have not qualified the affinity between particular actions and the worthiness of praise.

Suppose children are tasked with obtaining one hundred dollars. The boy elects to sell candy at his school, completing the goal with little time or struggle. The girl, however, aware of the boy’s method, decides to make a lemonade stand, waiting for customers. She sits, waiting in the hot sun for eight hours.

Though the boy utilized a more efficacious strategy which proved useful to the goal, some may in fact be inclined to consider the girl’s actions more laudable, as she elected a path which was not of least resistance—she did not take “the easy way out.”

If the theory of impressiveness be resumed, it remains congruent to this situation, as the girl has been impressive not with expedience but with industry.

If the boy had used a method which was still more efficacious yet abstruse, perhaps requiring philosophy or study, however, we may be inclined to consider his actions more laudable, perhaps because of the impressiveness of his intelligence and time usage.

Returning to the case of the girl, however, impressiveness is not required to explain laudability. Industry, along with the constituents of its class, such as determination, tenacity, and conscientiousness, are directly regarded as laudable traits.

Attributes of other classes, such as bravery, asceticism, patience, and forgiveness are also regarded as laudable traits. Among these, one element is common: the denial of a desire.

It may be noted that these desires map almost exactly upon the Christian seven sins: each one is emblematic of a human desire laudable when denied. Even more anodyne desires, such as pride, sloth, and gluttony have their laudable inverses: humility, industry, as mentioned, and temperance. Only bravery is not included.

The denial of positive desires, however, such as company, the happiness of others, and self-esteem do not share the same qualities of laudability. In fact, this inverse austerity is often considered harmful to humanity at large.

With this, it appears we have discovered the nature of what humanity considers laudable: the denial of desires not helpful to society, absolute impressiveness along with a lower consideration of relative impressiveness, and temerity.

For some, however, further inquisition is necessary. Virtually inextricably, the lauding of a person is a positive experience, and as such, necessarily implicates justice and morality.

Returning to the theory of impressiveness, we can identify that this is the origin of the sentiment claiming that man can only be worthy for his actions and not his circumstances; if this is not true, we cannot reconcile laudability with the putatively indispensable belief of human determination.

With this consideration, how shall the desert of praise be determined? Our forespoken doctrine declares no man shall be awarded for facts which are not engendered by him; therefore, we must recognize the variables which affect behavior and control for them in every consideration.

If two men reach different ranks yet would switch rankings exactly, had they been under the same circumstances we control for, we would assign them equal worth of praise, as the behaviors they exhibited engendered the same realities provided the same controlled circumstances.

Yet what circumstances shall be considered? Every circumstance which we expect to exert a relevant force upon the results: class, country, health, physicality, and other similar factors. Effectively, every circumstance from birth.

To many it may seem rebarbative to congratulate a person of higher status and a person of lower the same degree, even if the different positions can be imputed entirely to different circumstances. To maximize alignment with the tenets of justice and morality, however, such is necessary.

And so, finally, we have discovered that there is a system of laudability in man which is not necessarily aligned with justice and morality—when it is, every circumstance is controlled for and used to determine what man has done more to improve some quality.

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