This inquisition is written in conjunction with the theory presented in Morality. As such, we will consider Justice its own system with the following:

Freedom
Respect
Desert

Where Freedom consists of physical, emotional, and intellectual freedom, properly defined in Morality, Respect refers to the violation of Freedom if a subject were aware of actions or thoughts, and Desert refers to the functions with the domain of behaviors and the image of rewards, punishments, and responsibilities.

This bit decomposition is based upon the idea that all of these elements are “deserved”—the privation of them is unjust. The use of the term desert implies a redundancy, but the difference is based upon what is by default (freedom and respect) and what is earned (rewards, punishments, and responsibilities).

Let us begin with Freedom.

The only deviation in conceptions of Freedom can be found in physical freedom—many may believe that physical violations exist insofar as emotional violations which are enacted physically. That a man touching another man’s shoulder who he does not know is only materially immoral if it violates his emotional freedom.

To discover the nuances of freedoms let us consider the following:

Let a man sleep. During his sleep, a woman comes and kisses him. She immediately leaves for an unknown city. A man some distance away notices this. When the sleeping man awakens, he does not recall the events which occurred. If he becomes aware of the kiss, he will experience discomfort. The man who watched is aware of this fact. Will informing the man of the events which he was victim to increase the morality of the system?

This example confuses all of the freedoms: the physical freedom of the man by a kiss; his intellectual freedom of events which occurred relevant to his identity; the prospective compromise of emotional freedom if he becomes aware of this event.

We can infer that the value of intellectual freedom in this situation is high because of events which are relevant to the man—if the events were of no salience to him yet might still produce negative emotion, this question would be quite simple to answer. There is a similar case for physical freedom—had the woman simply touched his shoulder, the notion of a physical violation would be greatly lessened, and there would be no serious privation of emotional freedom in the man’s awareness of these facts.

In the actual situation, however, there does not appear to be a prevailing judgement. We may consider that the man “deserves to know,” but we may also find a difficulty in subjecting him to discomfort if he does not gain materially. We here identify a common contention of Freedom: the emotional and intellectual.

Let us now discuss Respect.

The most significant of deviations in Respect is likely motive in cognition. More specifically, that opinions or speech of which the subject is not aware are only characteristically immoral if they are motivated by an undeserved contempt. For example, that there is no characteristic immorality in conceiving of a man as unjustly simple-minded if the belief is not accompanied by inimical sentiment. Other systems hold that these behaviors are characteristically immoral upon their own merit.

Finally, there is Desert. This is the notion with the most deviations. Let us begin with dues:

There is a catholic agreement that very man receive his due and nothing less, but what of nothing more? Many believe that the existence of parvenus who are not worthy (a concept which will soon be discussed) of their status is unjust. This belief may be derived from two ideas:

a) that no man ought to be given that which is not his due, because this deviates from the exact image of desert, or

b) that giving a man what is not due to him lessens the dues which are given to others.

To illustrate:

Let a billionaire recognize the talents of a pianist. She promulgates the values of the arts and hard work and awards him a million dollars. Let her also find a man who is nowhere near as industrious, yet is winsome, for which she rewards him also a million dollars. Has a moral violation occurred?

Neither recipient had his suffering decreased—both were already well-off. Even so, many will take issue with the notion that a person who has performed actions which are laudable has been rewarded for it to the same degree as a person who has performed little or no actions laudable. We have thus identified a contention.

This transitions us well to another inquiry: what actions entitle positive desert?

Generally, it appears that we gravitate towards the critical theory in Laudability—we value the inverse of common vices (sloth, gluttony, cowardice). What appears to be very relevant but somewhat undiscussed in the original theory is the proper application of these virtues; we feel much more easily that a person deserves some thing if a virtuous property was applied optimally. We consider a man who works for a full day to complete a task deserving some particular thing with less difficulty than another man who works for a longer time due to inefficiency, even if he exerted himself further.

The relevance of the actions themselves are also constituents of the calculation of positive desert. Consider the following with the sign of material immorality:

Suppose two women compete against each other in a race, achieving the same time. The host then becomes aware of the fact that one of these women performed a wonderful deed prior to the race and gives her the award after acknowledging that both deserved it the same otherwise. Is this immoral?

Now let the first woman run slightly faster, so that she wins by a hair. The second woman is the individual who performed the wonderful deed, and seeing the small difference in completion times and the good deed, the host awards the second woman. Is this immoral?

Suppose a teacher has a cupcake and two students who will not know that a person received a cupcake if they individually did not. He knows one of them recently performed a very good deed. Is it moral to give that student the cupcake? Is it immoral to leave to a coin flip, or simply choose the other student?

Let two individuals accidentally spill their drinks on the floor. One of these people recently performed a wonderful deed. The person who did not is told by a staff member to clean up their drink. Is it moral or immoral for the staff member to tell the individual who performed the deed not to clean their mess, instead cleaning it themself? Is it moral or immoral to make the person who performed the good deed clean their own mess just as the other?

In these considerations of Justice, it seems that positive desert is contextual. That is, there is an exponential or necessary association between the weight of an action in a judicial system and the action’s connection to the reward. In the case of the women, it seems both actions from the host were unjust and therefore immoral, yet the second much more than the first. In the case of the students, there appears certainly to be morality in the giving of the virtuous student the cupcake, but the other options seem morally neutral. In the case of the drinks, it appears moral for the staff member to take the responsibility upon himself, not only because of self-sacrifice but also rewarding a good deed. This, however, does not mean that the individual “deserved” this treatment, as our intuition cautions: it is also moral to ensure that both clean their respective messes, as it is their responsibility. Supposing this theory to hold, let us consider negative desert with the same sign of material morality:

Suppose two women compete against each other in a race, achieving the same time. The host then becomes aware of the fact that one of these women performed an evil deed prior to the race and gives the other woman the award after acknowledging that both deserved it the same otherwise. Is this immoral? Is it moral?

Now let the first woman, who performed this evil deed, run slightly faster, so that she wins by a hair. Seeing the small difference in completion times and the evil deed, the host awards the second woman. Is this immoral? Is it moral?

Suppose a teacher has a cupcake and two students who will not know that a person received a cupcake if they individually did not. He knows one of them recently performed a very bad deed. Is it immoral to give that student the cupcake? Is it immoral to leave to a coin flip, but moral or neutral to choose the other student?

Let two individuals accidentally spill their drinks on the floor. One of them recently performed an evil deed. This person is told by a staff member to clean up their drink. Is it moral or immoral for the staff member to tell the individual who did not perform the evil deed not to clean their mess and have the individual who performed the evil deed clean it also?

In these considerations of Justice, it seems that negative desert is less contextual. That is, there is a linear or less necessary association between the weight of a negative action in a judicial system and the action’s connection to the punishment. In the case of the women, it seems only the second action of the host was unjust, a judgement we may believe to be just if the action was particularly egregious. In the case of the students, there appears certainly to be immorality in the giving of the malevolent student the cupcake, but the other option seems neutral, or perhaps necessary. In the case of the drinks, it seems that the staff member’s command is indeed immoral provided that the action is not seriously evil; in that case, the issue seems more divisive and without a catholic judgement.

Another aspect of Justice which appears very often resembles Compulsion: there are some actions which one must perform to remain in-line with the theory of Justice. Namely, responsibility and retribution. Consider again:

Let two individuals accidentally spill their drinks on the floor. One of these people recently performed a wonderful deed. Neither makes an effort to clean their mess. The individual who performed a wonderful deed reasons that she need not clean the mess because of her good deed. The other individual is simply uninterested in cleaning the mess. That the latter has committed materially and characteristically immoral act in her deviation from just principles is obvious—but does the same apply to the former?

It is certainly true that the former recognizes her good acts, but it seems the desert it engenders does not lessen her responsibility. In fact, depending on the delivery of the statement, we may be inclined to consider the judgement more characteristically immoral than the judgement of the individual who is simply uninterested in cleaning her mess, explained by the former’s adamance against a necessary responsibility. Again, positive desert is contextual: responsibilities cannot be lessened by extrinsic good deeds.

As visible in the previous example, there is common agreement that man must deal with the problems for which he is responsible, even if by accident—this is the nature of responsibility in Justice.

This applies not only materially however—man must also atone for his errors. Expiation is another common agreement of responsibility; whenever a man deviates from Justice while materially affecting others negatively, he must acknowledge his guilt and express his regret in those actions for the purpose of Justice alone to rejoin it. If the evil was physical, this process also includes indemnity. Beyond reinstating whatever items were arrogated, as is already necessary by Desert, effort which is clearly of the opposite motive of the original evil completes just contrition.

There is another type of responsibility: forgiveness. That at some point, there is a moral responsibility to release indignation and/or terminate punishment against a person who committed a behavior for which he should apologize. Some believe that forgiveness is always a responsibility. Others believe it is only a responsibility when a proper apology is performed. Others believe it is never a responsibility. Typically, all three of these ideas are present, simply dependent on the nature of the transgression.

The determination of this opinion may be a combination of mere sentiments but also some reason. The first may be that of Utility: not only does a person extricate himself from umbrage, but he also supports a culture of magnanimity which may lead the perpetrator and other wrongdoers to change their ways. The second rationale is clearly Justice: a individual’s critical morality exists in an instant, therefore if it becomes void of the characteristic moral attitudes which caused the transgressions he has made, it is no longer possible to hold him accountable for these actions justly since they do not represent him. An extreme example to illustrate this might be a tumor which makes a man kill a woman’s mother; once the tumor is removed, the man is the same, but he no longer has the capacity to intent to kill, making it impossible to justly hold those actions against him. The last case may again be Utility: it may be difficult to forgive, and extreme levels of accountability presumably reduce recidivism. If we consider these along the span of Justice only, however, we can still expect this diversity, though perhaps less.

There exists also a peculiar variation in the notion of Desert. Consider again the example of a teacher providing only half of his students with confections when it is certainly possible to provide all of them this privilege. We considered this a violation of Justice because all students were equally deserving of this privilege, yet only some were rewarded with it.

Instead, let these confections be sufficient for all and available for all to take. Now suppose these confections were of a particular kind, such that a small proportion of students could not eat them. It is easily possible, however, for the teacher to make a sufficient number of the cupcakes amenable to this minority’s physiology. Is it immoral for the teacher not to do this?

All have been afforded the same ability, and yet, this does not translate into actual privileges for all. Though there may not be an immorality in the case that the teacher is unable to modify the confections, the fact that such is possible, which translates into equal privileges determines the action to be materially immoral.

In terms of the interactions of the system we find contention between Desert and the combination of Freedom and Respect. More specifically, the affinity between castigation and freedoms—how much punishment one might deserve for characteristic immorality, especially as a function of time.

Let a man abuse a child. Let also him not be prosecuted for it. Finally, let those in his community not punish him or change their behavior towards him for it. This act from the community is characteristically immoral. There are two primary reasons for which this might be:

a) They did not punish him for his evil deed, when they must act such that man is responsible for his actions.

b) There was utility in the man’s castigation, as the action will be disincentivized, and the requirements of Compulsion were met.

The man will certainly have his Freedom violated in the recourse of the action—yet this is of no concern, as his actions engendered a desert which not only lessens his claim to that Freedom but also necessitates his punishment. What is of concern, however, is the weight of Freedom and Desert in this system. Many believe in “turning the other cheek,” some “an eye for an eye,” and others “they go low, I go lower.”

If we conceive of these positions as numeric values, we will not expect a ridiculous range between them; that is, very, very few believe extreme physical or psychological assault is acceptable as a response to name-calling, or that such an assault warrants little to no recourse.

Furthermore, there seems to be no rational basis for picking any specific doctrine. We may be inclined to attempt to connect this to the theory of Utility in retribution (that an action may not happen again), but even if we consider only the span of Justice, we still find this diversity.

Now, what has this disquisition afforded us? Though commonly intuitive, we are now equipped with the following facts to assist our analysis of Justice, often amorphous:

Some believe physical freedom only exists as emotional freedom.
There is often a lack of catholic judgement in the supremacy of intellectual or emotional freedom.
Some believe that in the subset of Respect which contains only opinions or speech, characteristic immorality is only possible if these elements are motivated by an undeserved contempt.
All believe that Justice requires individuals to have their due, and some believe that Justice disallows for individuals to gain if it is not their due.
People are worthy of things according to their laudability and optimal application.
Considerations of desert are almost entirely contextual when the desert is positive, but less so when it is negative.
Man must deal with the negative consequences of his actions, even if by accident.
Expiation is a form of responsibility, including indemnification when applicable.
Forgiveness may or may not be a form of responsibility, depending both on the severity of the transgression and he who performs the judgement.
In just recourse, there are various à priori philosophies.

Among these there are many irreconcilable elements of Justice; we can only discover inconsistency. They are often fixed in systems.

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