Though the construction of chance in the field of mathematics and statistical analysis is extremely strict, its conception by humans, existing prior to the proper construction of mathematics and statistical analysis, is entirely metaphysical, often forged through intuition. For what is meant by a probability? Parochially, it is simply a value which expresses the rate at which an event occurs. As it applies to reality, probability is an expression of expectation as a function of what is known—the “probability,” as it is described, will change based on knowledge. A researcher who observes the patterns of experimental units expects an even, or random, probability for his current subject to take the second of two paths presented because of the calculated proportion by historical data. The friend of the man, however, who is aware of his inveterate dislike of the right direction, computes the probability of such an action as much lower. The calculation is entirely contingent on history and circumstances known.

By this sense, there is no proof of any particular probability; an event will or will not happen, and the probability conceived is merely an expectation based on whatever facts are known, a notion acknowledged by theories such as Bayes’. It is merely a sensation of events avenir, because of what is not known.

For in the example, what is the probability that the man takes the right path? The friend has seen the man take the left path nine times to one, yet the researcher has seen hundreds take the path one to one. And what if a scientist has implanted a chip which has read the activity of the man’s subconscious, which has already decided to go left, an association which historically has never failed? Must there be a single probability to answer the question? Or are there multiple?

And so, it may be asked, can man come to a consensus concerning the probability of a particular event or fact? If man will claim different probabilities to events based upon experiences or knowledge that only he has, how will he reconcile that difference, vulnerable to doubt, with the experiences and knowledge of others? Such a sentiment is crucial to man’s reasoning ability, since much of debate is centered around evidence, a necessarily probabilistic element.

As a man watches one hundred vehicles pass on a road, and only one of them is a truck, we expect him to expect many more cars to pass before a truck passes. When he is asked, “with what probability do you expect the next vehicle to be a car?” we expect him to say high, or if he is particularly acute, ninety-nine to one.

If another man is asked, however, “with what probability do you expect the next person you pass in walking to greet you?” and he responds “high,” a discrepancy may appear between his expectation and our own.

By our understanding, greetings between people who pass each other on sidewalks is rare—in urban areas, the sheer number of strangers who pass one another physically and socially disallows significant rates of such greetings. If this man has lived his life in a smaller town, however, where community is much stronger and connected, or even in an urban area where it is simply cultural to greet strangers, he may be inclined to disagree. If we are not acquainted with any data or cultural norms of the region where this question is asked, there is no common reputed source for us to acquire a common probability. As such, as seen in both cases, man projects his previous experiences into the future to conjure a probability, particularly one which may be significantly different from another’s.

If such a probability comes up as a reference for a claim, or is subject of debate, how can this disagreement be resolved?

It is difficult to say. Perhaps, propitiously, there is a study or multiple instances of research whose rapport are sufficiently venerated by all parties which clues them into an accepted probability of an event for the purposes of their debate.

Very often, however, this is not the case. Much of discourse is concerned with probabilities that are experienced in daily life—experiences which are recalled by memory and consequently subject to every cognitive bias known to man.

Perhaps in these situations it can only be established that there are multiple conclusions based on postulated probabilities: if the probability of A is high, we have sufficient reason to believe X to be true. If the probability of A is even, we have sufficient reason to believe Y to be true. If the probability of A is low, we have sufficient reason to believe Z to be true. A more conclusive opinion may be reached when a study or some information which satisfies the necessary rapport for all parties is provided.

Even when probabilities are agreed upon, however, there is still great room for error. Because probabilities in debates without data are often discussed by ranges, such as low, even, or high, there is slight room for ambiguity. Though there is general agreement on the implication of an individual probability by this language usage, in the compounding of probabilities issues may occur.

If two ‘low’ probability events must be true for a particular conclusion, may such a conclusion be ruled out? ‘Low,’ as opposed to ‘pretty low,’ ‘extremely low,’ ‘a little low,’ ‘slightly low,’ or ‘maybe low,’ may lay between the ranges of 10-20% as a numerical representation. On the high end, the compounding of multiple ‘low’ probabilities (mathematically) results in 4%, 300% or 3% more likely (depending on the meaning of more) than its lower counterpart’s compounding, resulting in 1%, a difference most problematic with the considerations of multiple chances for an event.

Furthermore, what is the threshold for the rejection, acceptance, and hesitancy on a particular claim by probability? Statistical analysis widely accepts a minimum of 95% by its formulae to allow a particular claim. Is such a stipulation satisfactory for debate and reason? What range of probabilities do we assign to extremely unlikely; very unlikely; unlikely; a little unlikely; slightly unlikely; even, or random; slightly likely; a little likely; likely; very likely; extremely likely?

For example, what is the maximum probability that a particular activity engenders some negative outcome, perhaps texting while driving, before it can be declared morally inexcusable? Or bimodally, what is the relationship between the two? What probability of guilt is necessary to justify search and seizure or tentative immurement?

In cases of evidence which do not have empirical data from reputed sources to provide an accepted probability, for example, that an exemplary student has much to lose by cheating on a test, or has no need to, supporting the theory that she did or did not commit an ethics violation, what agreements can be found?

Without a strict and codified methodology for the consideration of probability in debate, namely one that provides strict guidelines concerning the relationship between a probability and its moral and logical consequences, or that mediates the conflict between different life experiences in cases where data is not available, there is ample room for every intellectually destructive force in the mind to become restive and preclude man’s agreement. Until such a process is designed and accepted, it seems any debate related to ethics or without data which incorporates any significant amount of probability which is not marginal to the extremes of one or zero in its positions will continue.

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