Any man who makes a contentious claim without proof has already admitted his ignorance.

Though a patently dogmatic and sententious notion, this phrase encapsulates a great proportion of human discourse. Much of discourse, especially the online, predicates its claims on nothing verbal, merely asserting its belief in opposition to the other. The malady is so severe it seems cogence is not a primary intention, if one at all.

Perhaps we must be reminded of the purpose of evidence. Every man is entitled to make the claims which please him. These claims, however, are very often in opposition to others’ or are victims of pyrrhonism. Why should the claim be believed, after all? What interest does one man hold in acquiescing to the dogma of another?

This is the purpose of evidence. It exists to grant credence to a claim, the less cogent sibling of its counterpart, proof, which makes the falsehood of a claim impossible.

Probability will prove a useful lens through which to view the notion of evidence. A particular unit of evidence engenders a particular probability related to its corresponding claim’s truth or falsehood. This is the nature of weak and strong evidence—the probability of the truthiness of a claim when weak evidence is introduced increases by very little, typically marginally. The probability of the truthiness of a claim when strong evidence is introduced increases very greatly, almost granting surety. Units of evidence which are sufficiently independent may also be compounded, such that the probability of falsehood decreases with the multiplication of the inverse probability of every individual unit of evidence. Units of evidence which are in fact significantly dependent cannot be considered this way; ideally, the extremes of the dependency and independency will be computed and using evidence which suggests the degree of the dependency, an estimate for a range of probability can be agreed upon.

Let us consider an example.

A boy experiences allergic symptoms during the summertime. When he tells his mother, she recalls the claims of her neighbors in which they detailed the administering of a novel drug to their children which palliated allergic reactions. In the mother’s mind, she has strong evidence supporting the notion that she ought to administer the drug mentioned by her neighbors to her son in order to improve his condition.

While listening to his mother’s line of reasoning, the boy recalls overhearing a group of parent neighbors discussing affecting stories related to parenting to other neighbors for status. In his mind, he has strong evidence supporting the notion that the information offered by the parents is factitious.

How can this dichotomy be reconciled? The mother has placed trust in the intentions, memories, and observations of the neighbors, while the son has not; the mother fears no ill effects from the drug, but the son does.

It may be noted that the second discrepancy could be expunged through independent information—studies or data from reputed sources. If there are any elements which make the applicability of those results dubious, however, such as sample sizes, procedure, author bias, or unclear language, the rift between the two positions will likely widen via dispute.

Because neither party has proof of the events which they recall involving parents, to each other, the anecdotes require evidence themselves—they cannot know for certain whether they have occurred or not. Because of this fact, other elements will be accounted for in determining the probability of the truthiness of their claims. Some of these have already been discussed expressly. Others, however, may be accumulated by extensive experience and inculcation. Will a mother trust her young child who opposes drug administration? Her beliefs on the reason of younger minds and their recalcitrance, even when an action may be helpful to them will be considered. And though these beliefs may be traced back to initial impressions, presenting all of these as evidence will be impossible due to the nature of human memory and awareness.

Similarly, the son’s beliefs relating to the probity of adults will be invoked. If the mother has been repeatedly guilty of varying degrees of perfidy, the son’s belief in what he overheard will be staunch. If he has witnessed allergic reactions to drugs experienced by peers, even if a reputed source claims a paltry probability of allergic reaction, his fear of such may not be commensurate with the information.

Fortuitously, public discourse often pertains to ubiquitous and pervasive issues, so man feels a preponderance, and commensurately, a need for empiricism. Commonly, this is achieved through logic, data, common human experiences, or combinations of these.

Logical evidence, or reasoning, as expected, is extremely common. It may be described by ipso facto, or the necessary consequences of facts. This is visible by a syllogism: a man cannot see if his eyes are closed. If a man is asleep, his eyes are closed. Therefore, if a man is asleep, he cannot see.

Data as evidence is also common. Though the term is typically associated with exact numerical values from reputed sources, when these are absent, terms such as “few” and “most” indicate anecdotally processed data. For example, that most decorous homes are more costly or that few people enjoy traffic.

Common human experiences as evidence are less ubiquitous, typically only invoked in colloquial disagreement and philosophical litanies, such as these. These arguments make use of anodyne claims to support a contentious position. If the claim relates to proportion, there is very strong overlap, perhaps analogy to data. An example of common human experience as evidence may be that accomplishment is emotionally satisfying, or that seats with proper cushioning are preferred.

By using these types of evidence man hopes to convince his dissenters, or at the very least, vindicate his position. In spite of this attempt, however, failure is very common. Simply, it is due to a lack of logical evidence.

Because man rarely explains the complex necessity that results from facts agreed upon, his position will only be acquiesced to if there is sufficient logical sentiment—if it “seems right.” To cite the association between home ownership and happiness and assert the lack of home ownership as a primary reason citizens are unhappy with their lives only persuades those with a proclivity to agree. Because the claim is controvertible, cogence will not be arrant.

As such, the apparent optimal cogence is cautious and exact—it recognizes that evidence is not proof and makes no equivocal or fallacious statement. It asserts only what is true by reason and every tacit element. That homeowners are typically happier than their counterparts, a fact which may be explained by the home ownership itself, or some factor which is closely associated with it. That the inability to own a home may cause sentiments of diffidence, or that a financial state which disallows for such a purchase does. Any overextension is argumentatively fatal.

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